Orgel's article itself doesn't contain any new research, and those who are keeping track might notice similarities to a previous essay on the same topic from 2000. The issue at hand is the origin of life, which owing to our inability to travel back in time is one of the most difficult subjects in biochemical research. It is almost impossible to know exactly what chemicals were present in the prebiotic milieu, what minerals and surfaces were available to perform catalysis, and which of the many possible environments was the one in which life actually arose. As such, the field is highly speculative. Orgel's essay is something of a reaction to this.
It is popular to speak of an "RNA world" of primitive organisms in which most or all of the functions currently performed by proteins were instead performed by RNA. This model has the advantage that RNA can have both informational content and catalytic activity, but it demands the question of where the RNA came from. Some elements of nucleic acids can form nonenzymatically from simple chemicals likely to be present in the prebiotic milieu, but the transition from adenine and ribose to a diverse oligosaccharide with a phosphate backbone is not trivial. If, however, enormous autocatalytic cycles existed on the prebiotic Earth, that would resolve many of these objections.
In his essay, Orgel seemingly meant to quell enthusiasm (I use the term in its pejorative sense) for this idea, not because he believes it is intrinsically false, but because it doesn't really make things easier for us. He takes as an example the reverse citric acid cycle, pointing out that although it is extremely useful, and moreover is autocatalytic, it requires numerous and diverse chemical activities, many of which could go awry if the wrong substrate were used for a step. The assertion that this cycle underpins the existence of life requires appropriate colocal catalysts acting with sufficient efficiency to keep the cycle running. Moreover, it requires that unproductive (or toxic) side-reactions not drain away the reactants at any step. That is, the catalysts present must discriminate between different possible reactants, so as not to break down components inappropriately before they advance in the cycle. It is not immediately apparent that this is possible (certainly it does not appear to be probable), and Orgel was not convinced by several of the attempts to justify prebiotic catalytic cycles. This article summarized his reasons for skepticism.
This attitude has been misrepresented as meaning that Orgel believed (A) that prebiotic autocatalytic cycles were impossible, and (B) that important life cycles are irreducibly complex. Both propositions are false, and it is also false that Orgel believed them.
Part of the rebuttal to proposition A is referenced in Orgel's paper itself, when he mentions Arthur Weber's recent work in which a reaction of various trioses with ammonia gave autocatalytic products. Although the cycle at work in that instance is not yet understood, Orgel points to it as being particularly promising, in part because it requires no additional catalyst, and in part because it yields high-energy carbon compounds of a kind that might be useful substrates for life.
Granted, the reactions of the Weber experiment may not be directly analogous to anything observed in modern organisms, but I feel that this should not be seen as a problem. After all, why would a primitive organism evolve an activity to perform catalysis already occurring naturally? Rather, one would expect that primitive organisms, whatever their informational and structural characteristics, used the products of autocatalytic cycles as raw material for more exotic activities, which were later repurposed to the production of raw materials as a way to gain a competitive edge or to respond to resource scarcity. If, additionally, very complex abiotic cycles similar to the TCA cycle existed to produce more exotic or useful substrates, it ceases to be quite as problematic if they are not highly efficient or specific. Indeed, these sorts of shortcomings would likely serve as a basis for establishing selective advantage for those organisms that evolved compensating protein catalytic activities.
It is not necessary that abiotic cycles intended to serve as a metabolic origin of life work perfectly, or even that they involve products and intermediates similar to those used by contemporary organisms. They need only be efficient and specific enough for life to get started, with intermediates and products that are useful enough for primitive organisms to benefit from them. Orgel's objection is not that this latter situation is impossible; rather he feels that it is sufficiently implausible that actual evidence is needed, rather than hopefulness and modeling.
The sharp-eyed will (hopefully) note the influence of Orgel's rules in the above, especially the First Rule: "Whenever a spontaneous process is too slow or too inefficient a protein will evolve to speed it up or make it more efficient." The rebuttal to proposition B, of course, comes in the form of Orgel's Second Rule: "Evolution is smarter than you are." The belief that any biological systems are irreducibly complex results merely from a failure to understand the enormous problem-solving potential of selection combined with random mutation and millions upon millions of years of time to work. Certainly Orgel would never have accepted that evolution could not produce these complicated cycles once given a chance, or that these cycles could not be broken down in a useful way for primitive organisms. Orgel's point is not that any of this is impossible, it is that it must be shown to be plausible:
The most serious challenge to proponents of metabolic cycle theories—the problems presented by the lack of specificity of most nonenzymatic catalysts—has, in general, not been appreciated. If it has, it has been ignored. Theories of the origin of life based on metabolic cycles cannot be justified by the inadequacy of competing theories: they must stand on their own.
Orgel's paper does not rule out the possibility of autocatalytic cycles, nor does it assert or even imply that some mystical intervention is necessary to explain how life came about. Orgel's paper is a demand for evidence. It is not enough to say that autocatalytic cycles solve the problem of biogenesis, nor even that they are more plausible than other explanations. Negative arguments do not suffice; a positive argument must be made and backed up by simulations, reconstructions, and experimental evidence. Orgel points favorably to several promising avenues of research in this regard.
Intelligent design is not among those avenues, and it is certain that Orgel would reject it. Having only a (flimsy) negative case in its favor, lacking even the virtue of plausibility, and ignoring his second rule, ID must be seen as weaker than any extant metabolic or genetic theories, which at least are not based on magic. Orgel's overall point is a valuable one. It is disgusting and disgraceful that, with flagrant disregard for his thinking, Orgel's essay should be misrepresented as supporting "if pigs could fly" views of the origin of life.
Primary citation:
Orgel, L.E. (2008). The Implausibility of Metabolic Cycles on the Prebiotic Earth. PLoS Biology, 6(1), e18. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0060018 OPEN ACCESS
Other peer-reviewed articles referenced:
Orgel, L.E. (2000). Self-organizing biochemical cycles. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 97(23), 12503-12507. DOI: 10.1073/pnas.220406697 OPEN ACCESS
Roy, D., Najafian, K., von Rague Schleyer, P. (2007). Chemical evolution: The mechanism of the formation of adenine under prebiotic conditions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(44), 17272-17277. DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0708434104
Weber, A.L. (2007). The Sugar Model: Autocatalytic Activity of the Triose-Ammonia Reaction. Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres, 37(2), 105-111. DOI: 10.1007/s11084-006-9059-9

8 comments:
"The belief that any biological systems are irreducibly complex results merely from a failure to understand the enormous PROBLEM-SOLVING POTENTIAL of selection combined with random mutation and millions upon millions of years of time to work."
To speak about the "problem-solving potential" of random mutation and natural selection is to suggest that the process is not so random after all, but rather goal-directed.
If the random mutations are purposeless, completely fortuitous, and not goal-directed, how can one apply the term "problem-solving" which to normal mind means an intelligent process with a goal to attain and THEN the problem-solving process figures out how to best attain that goal?
It seems to me that this interpretation engages a pair of false premises. The first of these is the idea that problem-solving is necessarily intelligent, which is false. Evolution is essentially a brute-force problem solver, in which every accessible combination is tried and the ones that work survive. Were we to personify evolution and make it play a computer game, it would do so by pressing every possible key until the game was solved—highly inefficient, not intelligent, but ultimately successful in solving the problem. The reason that evolution is smarter than us is not that its problem-solving approach is more intelligent or efficient, but rather that it has an enormous amount of time and raw material for idiotic "attempts".
The other misconception is that the problem-solving is somehow voluntary, that problems are chosen. However, random mutation is a constant process. Returning to the metaphor of the computer game, evolution would play the game not because we told it to but because evolution is always pressing buttons randomly, and would continue to do so long after the final cutscene, not realizing the game had been won. Random mutations are not trying to solve problems. Nonetheless, they have enormous potential to do so because of the brute-force approach of evolution.
In short, I apply the term "problem-solving" because problems get solved, not because the approach is one I would encourage algebra students to employ. Intelligent human problem-solving is much more efficient, but because our minds cannot sample sequence or conformational space as totally as billions of mutations, evolution can often answer questions that seem to us intractable. Hence the popularity of "directed evolution" experiments.
What is your opinion of those that have faith in both science and god?
They may view science as a way to understand all of God's creation with the understanding that just because they wanted him/her to act in a certain way (ID) doesn't mean that he/she did.
Well, as I think I made clear in the second Paul Davies post, believing in science and religion together almost always forces you to be a hypocrite about one of them. This is not necessarily true if you strictly believe in a God whose only purpose was to serve as first cause, or in the "kT God" or some other god of the gaps. However, when you reduce God to these dimensions I begin to wonder what God actually is anymore. At any rate, I don't believe it impossible or offensive to hold onto both religion and science, so long as you are honest about what you are doing, and clearly delineate for yourself and others the boundaries of the two systems of thought.
Maybe I am too philosophical in my approach but I believe that science is unable to answer all questions about the vastness of the human experience.
Do you consider yourself a strict materialist?
Enjoy the blog.
I wonder... is the human experience really all that vast, or does it merely seem so because our languages cannot convey the truths of our experiences in such a way that we see how similar the experiences of others are to our own? Is the human experience truly more vast and wondrous than the canine experience or the protazoan experience, or does it merely seem so because it is our experience? Is science unable to explain the experience because we can not learn enough, or because we have not learned enough?
My personal feeling is that we tend to overestimate our individual experiences and underestimate our collective ability to understand them given sufficient time and effort. Saying that love, and hatred, and the way you feel when the sun rises over the sea come from things like "God" and "the soul" is just a way of saying, "I don't understand." That doesn't explain the world, it just tosses blank slates into places where we lack knowledge—you can write anything there that you want. We have filled in those slates with science when it comes to fire, the stars, eclipses, and even pain. Is it so outrageous to believe we will eventually achieve the same with emotion?
If we succeed in doing so, will our experiences be lesser for it, or greater?
"Evolution is essentially a brute-force problem solver, in which every accessible combination is tried and the ones that work survive."
How does evolution know to try "every accessible combination?"
Why is it "trying" to do anything?
What is "an accessible combination?" How can one say that every single step, every mutation among the billions that are needed "works"?
One would never consider that someone entering keys randomly on a computer, even after billions of years, will come up with a software program that works. And yet, any software we have pales in comparison to the complexity, intelligence and function exhibited in every aspect of nature. If we do not think that a software program of any sophistication can be come about blindly by chance, how can we think that EVERY creature that we see, e.g., a cat, a bird, an octopus is each the result of a series of accidents "in which every possible combination is tried and the ones that work survive."
The simple fact is that scientists can evolve non-catalytic protein sequences into functional enzymes in the lab with less than 30 rounds of pressure and mutagenesis. This is not hypothetical. This is not a model. It is a demonstrated experimental fact. Moreover, given protein backbones that have known enzymatic activity, new features like thermal stability and functional catalysis in alcohol can also be added through the same evolutionary approach. In the last century wild bacteria have evolved novel activities to degrade antibiotics. Since 1935, bacteria have evolved enzymes to degrade nylon waste products. This is not airy hand-waving or magic, these are genuine observations of evolution in the wild and in the lab acting to produce novel activities in the space of a mere hundred years.
You can stick your fingers in your ears if you want, but if an RNA ligase can evolve in the lab in a month, if antibiotic resistance can evolve in hospitals within years, and if nylonases can appear in a few decades, why is it so difficult to believe that almost any activity could evolve among trillions and trillions of creatures in billions of years? Why do you insist on explaining existence with magic?
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